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Abstract
The 25th Anniversary of UNCLOS was commemorated in early February in Jakarta, just one 
month after the Chinese fishing vessels and coast guard entered the Indonesia’s EEZ and exploi-
ted its natural resources. From the Indonesian side, this China’s encounter has indeed violated 
the Indonesia’s sovereign rights over its EEZ as well as the breach of Indonesia’s sovereignty 
by undermining and intervening in Indonesia’s right under international law in exercising legal 
enforcement in its own jurisdiction. Moreover, the Indonesian government has consistently and 
persistently rejected the nine-dash line claims by sending official protests through diplomatic 
notes. The protest also exerts Indonesia’s firm and clear position that Indonesia is not a claimant 
state to either the sovereignty or territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and therefore will 
not engage in any negotiation. Furthermore, Indonesia would never recognize the nine-dash 
line claim since it does not have a legal basis recognized by international law. In contrast, the 
Indonesia’s sovereign rights are guaranteed by the UNCLOS, as the Indonesia’s EEZ had been 
acknowledged and registered under the UNCLOS. At the same time, Indonesia will be increa-
sing the frequency of patrols in Natuna waters, and fisheries activities as it is Indonesia’s rights. 
This Article attempts to identify and describe the Writers’ views over the Natuna case from the 
legal perspective. The responses of the Indonesian government against the claim are also briefly 
discussed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Indonesia will always comply with the UNCLOS. Indonesia has never 
questioned the presence of other states’ vessels in Indonesian sovereign 
rights’ waters. Indonesia’s state vessels charged in law enforcement will 
just expel those other state’s vessels that exploit Indonesia’s resources in 
the waters where Indonesia can exercise its sovereign rights.”1 
This year, the international community commemorates the 25th Anniver-
sary of the entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (hereinafter referred as “UNCLOS”). In terms of Law of the Sea, 
UNCLOS established for the first time one set of rules for the oceans, bringing 
1 The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Director General for Legal Affairs and International Treaties’ 
remarks to the 25th UNCLOS Anniversary Seminar, Jakarta, 2020
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order to a system fraught with potential conflict. The scope of the UNCLOS 
itself is vast, covering all ocean space, with all its uses, including navigation 
and overflight, all uses of all its resources, living and non-living, on the high 
seas, on the ocean floor and beneath, on the continental shelf and in the territo-
rial seas, the protection of the marine environment, and basic law and order.
Moreover, the UN Secretary-General’s has also given a remarks to Meet-
ing of State Parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on the 25th 
anniversary of its entry into force, stated 
“The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is a fundamental 
tool. Many of the current challenges facing our oceans can be addressed 
through the effective and comprehensive implementation of the provisions 
of the Convention. So, as we commemorate the 25th anniversary of the 
entry into force of this important instrument, I encourage all States that 
have not yet done so, to ratify or accede to it.”2
However, the recent activities in the South China Sea has showed us the 
vital role of freedom of navigation in Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) and 
the high seas. Throughout the long history of the ocean, freedom of navigation 
has always been one of the profound concerns of all nations.3 Fast forward 
to the negotiation of UNCLOS,4 freedom of navigation remained one of the 
paramount issues between coastal and maritime states.5 Coastal states trying 
to claim for more jurisdiction to be recognize as their sovereignty, however 
on the other hand, maritime states wants to ensure that still be a freedom of 
navigation as much as possible.6 
Therefore, UNCLOS tries to bridge both interest by creating some new 
legal regime such as limitation of national jurisdiction at sea, the right of free-
dom of navigation, security, sustainable use of the ocean, and nearly all ac-
tivities, which happen at sea, are regulated by UNCLOS. Moreover, the year 
2020 remarks the 25th anniversary of the UNCLOS, therefore it is the best 
2 Secretary-General’s remarks to Meeting of State Parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on the 
25th anniversary of its entry into force [as delivered], United Nations Secretary-General, accessed 4 April 
2020, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2019-06-17/secretary-generals-remarks-meeting-of-
state-parties-the-un-convention-the-law-of-the-sea-the-25th-anniversary-of-its-entry-force-delivered.
3  See James Kraska, Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea: Expeditionary Operations in 
World Politics (Oxford University Press New York, 2011); James Stavridis, Sea Power: The History of 
Geopolitics of the World Oceans (Penguin Press New York, 2017).
4  Thomas Wemyss Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea (Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1911,1976 rep), 3.
5  Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas or the Right which Belongs to the Dutch to Take Part in the East 
Indian Trade (Oxford University Press New York, 1633). 
6 Ibid. 27. In Chapter V of his book, Mare Liberum, Grotius argue that under the law of nations the sea 
has been regarded as the property of no one (res nullius), a common possession (res communis) and public 
property (res publica).
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time to reflect the 25 years of UNCLOS and to see the future challenges. The 
symposium therefore aims to gather academics and practitioners in the field 
of law of the sea from around the world to reflect and to think about the future 
of ocean governance.
Not only it was celebrated at the United Nations Offices and by all other 
state parties around the world, the UNCLOS 25th anniversary had also been 
celebrated in Indonesia. In this opportunity, the Writer who is also the Director 
General for Legal Affairs and International Treaties at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia was invited to speak during the First Ses-
sion under the theme “Law Enforcement by the Coastal State on the Territorial 
Waters and EEZ”, and presented the “Natuna Case over the South China Sea 
from the legal perspective”.
The structure of the article will start with the introduction which explain 
the UNCLOS in general and its relation with Indonesia, including UNCLOS 
as the constitution of the sea, Indonesia as an archipelagic state and party to 
UNCLOS, and the role of UNCLOS in Indonesia’s maritime legal system and 
strategy. In the second part, this article will point out the South China Sea’s is-
sue briefly, described from the background, its overlapping interests, how the 
dispute arises, until the actualization of the nine-dash line claims in the South 
China Sea itself. The third part will talk about the Indonesia’s response to the 
nine-dash line claims and the Natuna Incident comprehensively, as well as the 
recent Indonesia-China situation. And for the last part, this article will bring 
the conclusion and recommendation.
II. UNCLOS AND INDONESIA
A. UNCLOS AS THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SEA
Based on the principle that “the Land dominates the Sea”, UNCLOS, 
which often referred to as the “constitution of the sea”, allows a coastal state 
to extend its sovereignty beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in 
the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt 
of sea of 12 nautical miles, termed as the territorial sea.7 A coastal state also 
has economic sovereignty and jurisdiction over the exclusive economic zone 
of 200 nautical miles from the baseline and continental shelf, 8 which is the 
natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental 
7  Nguyen Hong Thao, “25th Anniversary of UNCLOS 1982 and its Implementation in Vietnam”, Maritime 
Issues, http://www.maritimeissues.com/law/25th-anniversary-of-unclos-1982-and-its-implementation-
in-vietnam. html.
8  UNCLOS, art 55.
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margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured and where the outer edge of the 
continental margin does not extend up to that distance.9 In exercising their 
rights and jurisdictions, coastal states must not infringe upon or result in any 
unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and freedoms of 
other States in their economic exclusive zones and continental shelves as pro-
vided for in this Convention.10 
UNCLOS provides also for the most comprehensive legal regime of mari-
time zones on the balance of the expansion of sovereignty rights and jurisdic-
tion of the coastal state in the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf 
with the common interests of the international community in the High Seas 
and the Area – known as the common heritage of mankind.
Most importantly, UNCLOS establishes and promotes a legal regime for 
what so called the “Archipelagic State”, which has become the milestone for 
Indonesia and other archipelagic states’ maritime legal system. UNCLOS has 
undoubtedly contributed to creating a new shape of both domestic and inter-
national legal systems on several countries with that specific regime of archi-
pelagic states. 
B. INDONESIA AS AN ARCHIPELAGIC STATE UNDER UNC-
LOS
One of the distinctive features of contemporary Indonesia is that it is an 
archipelagic state in which the government exercises sovereignty over the wa-
ters between the islands making up the country’s land territory as well as over 
the islands themselves. Historically, as an archipelagic state,  nearly all the 
waters lying between the islands of Indonesia were as open to the ships of all 
nations as were the waters in the middle of the great oceans up until the middle 
of the 1950s.11 These waters belonged to no state nor did any state claim any 
form of jurisdiction over them. As a consequence, Indonesia was made up of 
hundreds of pieces of territory separated from one another by high seas.
Then, on 13 December 1957, the cabinet of Prime Minister Djuanda Kar-
tawidjaja declared that the Indonesian government had ‘absolute sovereignty’ 
over all the waters lying within straight baselines drawn between the outer-
most islands of Indonesia. These baselines, encompassing as they did all the 
islands making up the country, formed Indonesia—its lands and the seas over 
which the government now asserted sovereignty—into a single unified terri-
9  UNCLOS, art 57.
10  UNCLOS, art 56 (2).
11  John G. Butcher and R. E. Elson, “How Did Indonesia Become An Archipelagic State”, The Australian 
Strategic Institute, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indonesia-became-archipelagic-state. 
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tory for the very first time.12
It has been a very long process before eventually, in 1982, Indonesia 
gained international recognition for its claim when the UNCLOS formally 
recognized the existence of a new category of states known as archipelagic 
states and declared that these states had sovereignty over their ‘archipelagic 
waters’. Indeed, all the efforts were paid off when the archipelagic-state con-
cept was successfully adopted into part 4 of the 1982 UNCLOS.13 Indonesia 
was now allowed legally to exercise its archipelagic baseline connecting its 
outermost points of its outermost islands as demanded by the declaration. The 
waters within the baseline became archipelagic waters, within the full sover-
eignty of the archipelagic state.
In the end, UNCLOS which took more than 10 years in the making and 
now celebrating 25 years old, with its fast approaching universal participation, 
is perhaps one of the most significant accomplishments in the arena of interna-
tional law. Therefore, with its Part 4 of the Archipelagic State’s concept which 
belongs to Indonesia’s ultimate victory and greatest achievement in the field 
of international law, UNCLOS has been contributing in shaping both Indone-
sia’s maritime domestic law and maritime strategy ever since then.
C. INDONESIA’S MARITIME LEGAL SYSTEM AND STRAT-
EGY
UNCLOS has promoted the development and improvement of Indone-
sia’s maritime legal system. With effect on December 31, 1985 Indonesia has 
ratified the UNCLOS through the Law Number 17 of 1985, considering UN-
CLOS as a comprehensive legal document regulating Indonesia’s maritime 
issues such as definitions and legal regimes of its maritime zones, maritime 
jurisdiction enforcement and marine economy development. 
From that time, all the Indonesia’s domestic law related to the maritime 
issues, such as boundaries, marine and fisheries, marine resources and envi-
ronmental protection, and so on, as well as the defence issues-related laws, 
are basically consistent and compatible with those of UNCLOS provisions. 
Moreover, dozens of related documents, including government decrees and 
ministerial decisions are also subject to provisions under UNCLOS.
12  Muhammad Taufan and Aloysius Selwas Taborat, “The Djuanda Declaration Has More to Offer”, The 
Jakarta Post, https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2017/12/14/the-djuanda-declaration-has-more-to-
offer.html
13  Through sheer determination and formidable diplomacy, Indonesia’s negotiators were able to get the is-
sue of the archipelagic state discussed as a separate agenda item in the third conference in 1973. Damos Du-




The country has also signed numbers of international conventions, agree-
ments, memorandum of understandings, joint statements, and other form of 
legal instruments, in the level of either bilateral or multilateral, and in the 
scope of either regional or international. UNCLOS, moreover, has also driven 
Indonesia to accede to various international maritime conventions. It can be 
seen that UNCLOS not only demonstrated that it is the basis for national, re-
gional and global action and cooperation in the marine sector, but also that its 
legal regime allows for sufficient flexibility to ensure its durability over time, 
while also addressing future challenges, those can be adopted in each coun-
tries’ domestic legal system, including Indonesia.
Furthermore, in terms of maritime strategy, UNCLOS also provides the 
basis for Indonesia to develop its own maritime vision, later known as the 
Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). The goal of this GMF policy 
is making Indonesia as a sovereign, advanced, independent, strong maritime 
nation that is able to provide positive contribution for peace and security in the 
region as well as to the world. The first Plan of Action is for the period 2016-
2019 which highlights five priority pillars: Maritime Boundary, Ocean Space 
and Maritime Diplomacy; Maritime Industry and Sea Connectivity; Services 
and Industry of Marine Natural Resources and Marine Environment Manage-
ment; Maritime Defence and Security; and Maritime Culture.14
Moreover, the GMF vision highlights Indonesia’s view of itself as an in-
ternational promoter of peace. One of the GMF pillars on defence and security 
is to enhance Indonesia’s participation in regional and international coopera-
tion on maritime defence and security. On maritime diplomacy, the policy 
indeed explicitly states that Indonesia must play a leadership role in various 
maritime cooperation and initiatives at the regional and multilateral levels.
II. THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
A. BACKGROUND
As mentioned earlier that the Indonesia’s maritime policy strongly em-
14  The roadmap of the Indonesia Ocean Policy (IOP) highlights seven policy pillars: Marine and Hu-
man Resources Development; Maritime Security, Law Enforcement and Safety at Sea; Ocean Governance 
and Institutions; Development of Maritime Economy; Ocean Space Management and Marine Protection; 
Maritime Culture; and Maritime Diplomacy. Each of the policy pillars is further broken down into policies/
strategies, altogether totalling 76 policies/strategies. The implementation of the IOP is carried out by the 
ministries and non-ministerial government agencies according to their respective roles and functions under 
the supervision of the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “The Emergence 
of Indonesia’s Ocean Policy”, RSIS Commentary, No. 028 (2018), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/02/CO18028.pdf.
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phasize Indonesia to play a leadership role in various maritime cooperation 
and initiatives at the regional and multilateral levels, it’s one of Indonesia’s 
responsibilities to take into account of, and be synergised with, the various 
regional initiatives as long as they are in line with its national interests and can 
make positive contributions to peace, especially in the region.
Therefore, when the South China Sea conflict arises since many years ago, 
Indonesia is one of the countries that always promote peaceful discussions 
in depth over the recent developments in the South China Sea and expressed 
serious concern over the recent incidents. In this regard, with other countries, 
both at bilateral and multilateral level, Indonesia emphasizes the importance 
of maintaining peace, and stability in the South China Sea, the continued ex-
ercise of self-restraint by all parties concerned, and the promotion of confi-
dence-building measures in this area. 
In the region, for instance, the countries reaffirmed the importance and 
continued relevance of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea (DOC) of 2002, as a milestone document between ASEAN Mem-
ber States and China, embodying their collective commitment to promoting 
peace, stability and mutual trust and to ensuring the peaceful resolution of 
disputes in the area, in accordance with universally recognized principles of 
international law, including the UNCLOS. All ASEAN member states called 
on all parties to respect the freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the 
South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of 
international law, including UNCLOS.15
However, the fact that the South China Sea region could be one of the 
most disputed areas in the world due to its many overlapping claims and in-
terest, it may requires more extra efforts and special approach to handle this 
issue. The South China Sea dispute is very well complicated in terms of its 
nature, the sovereignty issues of the islands, delimitation issues, resources 
utilization as well as other matters concerning security (both traditional and 
non-traditional).
B. OVERLAPPING INTEREST IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
The South China Sea which, in one hand, has many potential conflicts and 
in the other hand, extremely rich in resources, surrounded by land belonging 
15  The parties also stressed the importance of promoting a peaceful, friendly and cooperative environment 
in the South China Sea, and the continued constructive dialogue between ASEAN and China in this regard. 
Subsequently, the parties look forward to the finalization of the Guidelines at the upcoming ASEAN-China 
Senior Officials’ Meeting on the Implementation of the DOC. ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Communiqué of 




to several different states. For the past century, a number of sovereign states 
have laid claim to an overlapping territory in the South China Sea. The dispute 
revolves primarily around the control of two archipelagos, the Paracel and 
Spratly Islands, and their surrounding ocean areas.
The Spratly Islands, which measuring just over three (3) square miles, con-
sist of a group of 100 small islands and reefs which host rich fishing grounds. 
There may also be oil and gas deposits, but these prospects have yet to be ex-
plored. 16 Its 170-plus features collectively are located in the southern part of 
the South China Sea, extending for about 900km from southwest to northeast. 
The majority of the Spratlys are in fact submerged banks, reefs and low-tide 
elevations. Only 36 are known to rise above high-tide to form tiny islands, 
the biggest of which (Itu Aba Island) is a mere 1.4km long and 400m wide. 
The total land area of the Spratlys has been estimated to be less than 8 km2, 
yet they are scattered over an area of around 240,000km2.17 Estimates of the 
total contested maritime area in the South China Sea vary considerably but far 
exceed this figure. The Spratlys are located off the coasts of the Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Vietnam and are south of the Paracel Islands. This territory is 
currently contested among China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, 
and Brunei. More specifically, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim the Spratlys 
in their entirety, while Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines claim only part 
of the islands. 
While a bit larger in size than the Spartlys, the Paracel Islands are com-
posed of 130 small coral islands and reefs. The Paracels also hold excellent 
grounds for fish and natural resources such as oil and gas. The area is approxi-
mately equidistant from the southern coast of China and the eastern coast of 
Vietnam. Since 1974, the Chinese military has garrisoned and occupied the 
land after seizing the territory from Vietnamese troops. 18 Those who claim the 
Paracel Islands include China, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
C. HOW THE DISPUTE ARISES
The South China Sea disputes arise when the Paracels become the object 
of disputes between China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and claims to the Spratlys 
are contested either entirely or in part by six parties, including Brunei, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, China, the Philippines and Vietnam. And, furthermore, this China’s 
argument for its sovereignty is based historically on the claim of prior discov-
16  Yeju Choi, “The South China Sea Dispute: Stimulating the Next Global Conflict”, Kennesaw State Uni-
versity, http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/South_China_Sea_Final.pdf
17  John Robert Victor Prescott and Clive H. Schofield, “Undelimited Maritime Boundaries of the Asian Rim 
in the Pacific Ocean”, International Boundaries Research Unit 3, no. 1 (2001), 58.
18  Yeju Choi, “The South China Sea Dispute”.
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ery and on a decision of the San Francisco Conference of 1951 that required 
Japan to return several islands in the East China Sea to China.19
China claims all of the Spratly (Nansha) Islands on the basis of its discov-
ery and presence from the period of the Han dynasty (2nd century BC). China 
then made its first official claim to the Spratly Islands in 1950, less than a year 
after its foundation, in response to the Philippines claims. China maintains a 
claim to a U-shaped ‘traditional sea boundary line’ which later known as what 
so called a “Nine-Dash Line”, a broken or dashed line encompassing the ma-
jority of the South China Sea.20 
It is indeed unclear precisely what this U-shaped nine-dash line repre-
sents, but it does not appear to be a jurisdictional limit marking the extent of 
China’s claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or a claim to historic waters 
as some analysts have suggested. Instead it seems to be designed to illustrate 
which islands are claimed by China; that is all the Spratlys and Paracels.21
D. THE ACTUALIZATION OF NINE-DASH LINE CLAIMS IN 
SCS
The claims of nine-dash line in the South China Sea, in fact, have been 
actualized since many years ago. There were at least four major incidents and 
battles occurred in the South Chinas Sea as part of the China’s nine-dash line 
claim since 1975. It started for the first time in 1975 when China and Vietnam 
marked the South China Sea battle over the Paracel Islands. Then, followed 
by China’s claim on James Shoal in 1984, and went on battle again in 2012 
between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal, and the last in 
both 2017 and 2019, when China and Vietnam disputed the Vanguard Bank’s 
Oil. The long history of the 9 dash line claim over the South China Sea can be 
explained in the paragraphs below.
1. Battle of the Paracel Islands, China and Vietnam in 1975
The Battle of the Paracel Islands was a military engagement between the 
naval forces of China and South Vietnam in the Paracel Islands on January 19, 
1974. The battle was an attempt by the South Vietnamese navy to expel the 
Chinese navy from the vicinity.22 Prior to the battle, Vietnam had controlled 
some islands within the Paracel archipelago (Xisha in Chinese, and Hoang Sa 
in Vietnamese) and China had controlled others. Both sides claimed them in 
19  Hans Dieter-Evers., 81.
20  John Robert Victor Prescott and Clive H. “Undelimited Maritime Boundaries”.
21  Ibid.
22  Ralph A. Cossa, “Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers 
of Conflict,” Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies, no. 1 (1998).
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full, as did Taiwan. During the battle, three of the four Vietnamese warships 
had to retreat while the fourth sank with its captain on board.23
As a result, China gained control over the entire group of islands, now part 
its newly-established Sansha prefecture. Furthermore, China gained control 
over all of the Paracel Islands. South Vietnam protested to the United Nations, 
but China, having veto power on the UN Security Council, blocked any efforts 
to bring it up.24 The remote islands had little value militarily, but diplomati-
cally the projection of power was beneficial to China.25
2. China’s Claim on James Shoal, China and Malaysia in 1984
Historically, James Shoal, along with its two nearby features, Parsons’ 
Shoal and Lydie Shoal, were recognised by British surveyors in the early 19th 
century via many of its surveys.26 James Shoal first appeared on the British 
Admiralty Chart in the 1870s.27 And geographically, this James Shoal lying 
about 45 nautical miles northwest of Bintulu, Malaysia, on the continental 
shelf of Borneo, the shoal is 80 kilometres from the Malaysian coast and about 
1,800 kilometres from the Chinese mainland.28 In fact, it sits south of the 
Spratly Islands, but is sometimes grouped with them as part of international 
disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea. The shoal is embedded in 
the continental shelf of Malaysia and well within its 200 nautical mile EEZ.29
From the perspective of the territorial disputes, Malaysia’s claim on the 
shoal is based on the continental shelf principle, on the basis that Malaysia 
is the only country whose continental shelf covers James Shoal.30 While the 
shoal is claimed to be the southernmost territory of China and Taiwan.31
23  Ibid.
24  Bernard Gwertzman, “Peking Reports Holding U.S. Aide”, The New York Times, 26 January 1974 https://
www.nytimes.com/1974/01/26/archives/peking-reports-holding-us-aide-condition-of-observer-for-emb 
assy.html.
25  James M. Markham, “Saigon Reports Clash with China”, The New York Times, 19 January 1974  https://
www.nytimes.com/1974/01/19/archives/saigon-reports-clash-with-china-officer-says-3-vietnamese-sol-
diers.html.
26  Bill Hayton, “How a Non-existent Island Became China’s Southernmost Territory”. South China Morn-
ing Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1146151/how-non-existent-island-be-
came-chinas-southernmost-territory.
27  Ibid. 
28  Joint Submission to United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS)” (PDF). 
United Nations. 20 May 2009. Retrieved 15 March 2015.
29  B. A. Hamzah, “China’s James Shoal Claim: Malaysia the Undisputed Owner”, RSIS (Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies) Commentaries, Nanyang Technology University, Singapore. https://www.
rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO14122.pdf.
30  Active exploration and development of oil and gas fields by Malaysia has been taking place around the 
James Shoal since 2014, with several production facilities erected in the surrounding area. Malaysia has 
also been undertaking exploration for and production of hydrocarbon resources on a sustained basis in the 
area, effectively asserting jurisdiction over the area. Ibid.
31  Ibid.
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3. Battle of Scarborough Shoal, China and the Philippines in 2012
The Scarborough Shoal claimed by both China and the Philippines. Tai-
wan also claims the shoal as part of its territory. A Philippine Navy surveil-
lance plane spotted eight Chinese fishing vessels anchored in the waters of 
Scarborough shoal on April 8, 2012.32 An offshore patrol vessel of the Philip-
pine Navy was sent on the same day by the Philippine Navy to survey the vi-
cinity of the shoal, and confirmed the presence of the fishing vessels and their 
ongoing activities. Furthermore, on April 10, 2012, a Philippines offshore pa-
trol vessel came to inspect the catch of the fishing vessels. This Philippines’ 
naval vessel inspection team claimed that they discovered illegally collected 
corals, giant clams and live sharks inside the first vessel boarded by the team.33 
It was reported that they attempted to arrest the Chinese fishermen but were 
blocked by two Chinese maritime surveillance ships.34 Since then, tensions 
have continued between the two countries.
4. Vanguard Bank’s Oil Dispute, China and Vietnam in 2017 and 2019
Tensions had risen once again in the South China Sea after all the battles 
and disputes those mentioned above. For weeks in 2019, Chinese and Viet-
namese coastguard vessels have been involved in a confrontation after a Chi-
nese geological survey vessel entered waters near the Vietnam-controlled Van-
guard Bank on 3 July 2019.35 The incident has upset both Hanoi’s leadership 
and the Vietnamese public, and led the US to criticise Beijing for “bullying 
behaviour” in the area.36 Moreover, a spokesperson for the U.S. Department of 
State, released a statement condemning China’s “repeated provocative actions 
aimed at the offshore oil and gas development of other claimant states threaten 
regional energy security and undermine the free and open Indo-Pacific energy 
32  Tina G. Santos, “PH, Chinese naval vessels in Scarborough Shoal standoff”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
https://globalnation.inquirer.net/32341/ph-chinese-naval-vessels-in-scarborough-shoal-standoff.
33  Elton Lugay, “Filipinos, Vietnamese in US close ranks: Boycott Chinese products”, Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/41565/filipinos-vietnamese-in-us-close-ranks-boycott-chinese-
products.
34  Christopher Bodeen, “China travel agencies suspend trips to Philippines”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
11 April 2012, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/36217/china-travel-agencies-suspend-trips-to-philippines.
35  The Vanguard Bank basin is the westernmost reef of the Spratly islands and is known for its rich oil 
and gas reserves. The area also hosts Vietnam’s strategic oil rigs, a collection of around 24 service stations 
considered to be “ocean fortresses” to fend off intruders. The reef sits well within the 200 nautical miles 
of Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) set down by the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS), so is too important for Vietnam – economically and politically – to concede. Trinh Le, 
“The Vanguard Bank Standoff Shows China Remains Undeterred”, The Interpreter, https://www.lowyinsti-
tute.org/the-interpreter/vanguard-bank-standoff-shows-china-remains-undeterred.
36  The United States has expressed concerns over recent Chinese geological survey activity and “interfer-
ence” with Vietnam’s activities in disputed waters in the South China Sea. Ankit Panda, “US Slams China’s 





Interestingly, the ship briefly left the region to resupply, only to return in 
recent days. As we know, this latest stand-off harks back to a similar incident 
five years ago following the intrusion of a Chinese oil rig, which at the time 
triggered a wave of unprecedented anti-China protests and riots in Vietnam 
and brought relations between the two communist regimes to their lowest 
point since the bloody border war in 1979.38
Many maritime experts at that time came out with a statement that Beijing 
should not conduct any activities that would complicate the situation in the sea 
and violate Vietnam’s sovereign rights in the Vanguard Bank area in the South 
Chiba Sea. The actions so far have violated Vietnam’s sovereignty under the 
International Law.39
Moreover, the tension at Vanguard Bank hardly represents the first time 
Chinese ships have infringed on Vietnamese territorial waters or faced allega-
tions of pressure on resource projects. However, the government of Vietnam 
views this latest incident differently. It was because this Vanguard Bank basin 
is the westernmost reef of the Spratly islands and is known for its rich oil and 
gas reserves.40 Indeed, it is too important for Vietnam – economically and 
politically – to concede.
Furthermore, as what explained above, those four major incidents and 
battles occurred in the South Chinas Sea as part of the China’s nine-dash line 
claim were just one of Chines tactics. Even when the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in The Hague dismissed the nine-dash line claim as groundless 
in 2016, instead of working through the issues by legal means, the Chinese 
government continues to adopt its unilateral approach. In the other side, all 
those countries challenged by China had also been rightfully protested those 
Chinese aggression over their disputed areas in the South China Sea region 
and have alleged that Chinese ships have violated their sovereignty, sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction under UNCLOS.
37  Ibid.
38  Derek Grossman, “Why Vanguard Bank and Why Now? Explaining Chinese Behavior in the South 
China Sea,” The Randblog, https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/08/why-vanguard-bank-and-why-now-ex-
plaining-chinese-behavior.html.
39  Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Vietnam justified in defending its rights in Vanguard Bank in South Chi-
na Sea,” The Economic Times-India Times, 30 September 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
news/defence/vietnam-justified-in-defending-its-rights-in-vanguard-bank-in-south-chinasea/article-
show/71368439.cms?utm_source=contento finterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.
40  Trinh Le, “The Vanguard Bank Standoff Shows China Remains Undeterred”, The Interpreter, https://
www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/vanguard-bank-standoff-shows-china-remains-undeterred.
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III. THE INDONESIA-CHINA SITUATION
A. INDONESIA’S RESPONSE TO THE NINE-DASH LINE 
CLAIMS
Indonesia’s response to the nine-dash line claim has always been clear, 
concise, and right to the point. As also stated by the Writer in his presenta-
tion during the UNCLOS 25th Anniversary seminar, that the claims regarding 
the nine-dash line are rejected by countries, violating the UNCLOS, and has 
indeed no legal basis. This  statement has always been Indonesia’s position up 
until now concerning the nine-dash line. 
First, Indonesia is not a claimant state to either the sovereignty or ter-
ritorial disputes in the South China Sea. This position was stated in several 
diplomatic notes addressed to government of the People Republic of China 
since 2010. Indeed, for Indonesia, the dispute is not about maritime features 
but China’s illegal claim over the Indonesia’s EEZ. Furthermore, China made 
illegal claims over Indonesia’s EEZ stating that it is within China’s traditional 
relevant waters.
In the other opportunity, the Indonesian government has also emphasized 
that Indonesia is not claimant States in the South China Sea dispute, simply 
because Indonesia does not claim any feature in the area and no state claims 
any feature within Indonesia’s South China Sea waters.41 Even though this 
Natuna Archipelago is within the Indonesian waters but geographically also 
part of the South China Sea region.42
Second, the Tribunal instituted under Annex VII to the UNCLOS, between 
the Republic of the Philippines against the People’s Republic of China (The 
South China Sea Arbitration/the Tribunal) has already confirmed that the nine-
dash line is invalid under UNCLOS. Therefore, the international communities 
as well as the other countries need to comply or at least respect the Tribunal 
award. As a result, the nine-dash claims are rejected by countries.
Even though China has reiterated they will not obey the Tribunal ruling 
as it did not acknowledge its jurisdiction in the case, and refused to attend the 
entire proceedings in The Hague, the Netherlands.43
Furthermore, Indonesia notes that its view concerning the maritime en-
41  Damos Dumoli Agusman, “The South China Sea UNCLOS Tribunal Award 2016: What is has changed 
and what it does mean to Indonesia,” Indonesian Journal of International Law 14, no. 2 (2017): 130-150.
42  Ibid.
43  Dhiana Puspitawati and Mohd Hazmi Mohd Rusli, “Defending territorial integrity over Natuna Islands, 




titlements of the maritime features as reflected in the Tribunal award in which 
no maritime features in the Spratly Islands is entitled to an Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone or a Continental Shelf of its own. In conclusion, the Tribunal has 
clarified that there are no more contested waters, but only the undelimited 
waters. At the same time, some features are solved, that the low tide elevations 
are not subject to appropriation and the low tide elevations within the EEZ 
will belong to the coastal states which have such EEZ.
And third, the nine-dash line claim has no legal basis. Indonesia has been 
following closely all the debates over the nine-dash line claim and has also 
sent its diplomatic notes, for example in 2010 and 2012, to reassert its position 
concerning the nine-dash line claim that there is no clear explanation as to the 
legal basis, the method of drawing, and the status of those separated nine-dash 
line. Indonesia has submitted its position on the nine-dash line’s map through 
a diplomatic note of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to 
the United Nations dated 8 July 2010 addressed to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations. The note is essence affirmed that the nine-dash line’s map 
lacks of international legal basis and is in contravention to the UNCLOS.
In May 2020, Indonesia reiterates again that the nine-dash line’s map im-
plying historic rights claim clearly lacks international legal basis and is tanta-
mount to upset UNCLOS. This view has also been confirmed by the Award of 
the Tribunal that any historic rights that the People’s Republic of China may 
have had to the living and non-living resources were superseded by the limits 
of the maritime zones provided for by UNCLOS.
B. THE CHINA’S BEHAVIOURS AND INCONSISTENT CLAIMS
 As Indonesia has responded this nine-dash claims firmly, in the other 
hand, the Chinese government has also given their responses. First of all, Chi-
na has never protested the 1969 Indonesia-Malaysia Continental Shelf Agree-
ment in the South China Sea (within the nine-dash line), while this agreement 
was deposited and announced in the United Nations. Moreover, China has 
never protested the Indonesian Declaration on the EEZ in 1980 even though it 
was clearly announced that this EEZ boundaries in the South China Sea were 
within the nine-dash line. 
Furthermore, China has also never protested against the Indonesian map 
since the 1980s which was officially issued by the Indonesian Agency, that has 
drawn the boundaries of the Indonesia’s EEZ to the nine-dash line. And lastly, 
during the UNCLOS negotiations way back in the 1980s, the Chinese Delega-
tion never raised the nine-dash line claim, even though many countries at that 
time raised various issues that could potentially affect their national interests 
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once UNCLOS entered into force. For instance, Malaysia, Thailand, and Sin-
gapore raised the issue of traditional rights which was later accommodated in 
the UNCLOS.
From this inconsistent behaviours, we can exactly pointed that this China 
response could led to the situation where, in fact, China put aside the differ-
ences, the “cooperation”, but in the same time they still work in actualizing the 
claim, resulting in a “grey zone and strategic ambiguity”. In the other hand, 
the Chinese government are likely to tone down the issue, while again in the 
same time they reposition the claim to be more international law-friendly nar-
ratives.
Besides all the absence of legal basis and those China inconsistent behav-
iours, China also has its another “inconsistent claims” in using term to refer 
their what so called “rights” with no coherent legal basis. Starting in 2009, 
China used the term “traditional fishing area” for the first time to justify their 
claim to fish in Indonesia’s EEZ.44
Furthermore, in 2016, there was a changing term process of China’s claim, 
from “traditional fishing area” to “traditional fishing ground”. While three 
years later, on in 2019 precisely, there was another term of the same claim 
which known as “historic rights in relevant waters”.45 In conclusion, in terms 
of behaviours and even in utilising the legal terminology, China has never 
been consistent to refer their rights in those nine-dash line claims.
IV. THE NATUNA INCIDENT
A. BACKGROUND
The South China Sea could become a flashpoint between China and Indo-
nesia, the South East Asia’s biggest nation but with no claim in South China 
Sea region.46 The Government of the Republic of Indonesia reacted firmly 
to these Chinese claims. Indonesia recently rejected China’s claims over a 
disputed part of the South China Sea as “having no legal basis” as explained 
before. It also protested to Beijing over the presence of a Chinese coastguard 
vessel in its territorial waters. This Chinese boat trespassed into Indonesia’s 
44  Damos Dumoli Agusman, “Understanding the Natuna Incident”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic 
of Indonesia, 2020. 
45  Ibid.
46  Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Vietnam justified in defending its rights in Vanguard Bank in South Chi-





EEZ off the coast of the northern islands of Natuna, leading Indonesians of-
ficials to issue a “strong protest” and summon the Chinese ambassador in 
Jakarta.
B. THE INCIDENT’S TIME FRAME
This Natuna incident began on 19 December 2019, when the Indonesian 
Coast Guard vessel detected the presence of two Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) 
vessels (No. 5302 and 5403) and a Chinese Maritime Surveillance vessel in 
the Indonesia’s EEZ. These three vessels of the People’s Republic of China 
exercised an escort operation for 63 Chinese fishing vessels conducting illegal 
fishing activities in the Indonesia’s EEZ.47
Furthermore, on 24 December 2019, the Indonesian Coast Guard (KN 
Tanjung Datu) approached the Chinese Coast Guard 5302 and requested the 
vessels to order the Chinese fishing vessels to cease the illegal fishing ac-
tivities and promptly leave the Indonesia’s EEZ. However, the request of the 
Indonesian Coast Guard was disregarded by the Chinese Coast Guard. While 
pursuing to expel Chinese fishing vessels from Indonesia’s EEZ, the Indo-
nesian Coast Guard vessel was hindered by the Chinese Coast Guard vessel 
5403 while the Chinese Maritime Surveillance vessel continued escorting the 
Chinese fishing vessels. And up until 30 December 2019, the Chinese Coast 
Guard vessels were still found in the Indonesia’s EEZ.
These two major incidents, indeed, has led the Indonesian Government, 
through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Ministry) to summon the Chinese 
ambassador in Jakarta and to issue a protest through a diplomatic note ad-
dressed to the government of the People’s Republic of China via its embassy 
in Jakarta. The diplomatic note dated 30 December 2019 utilized the “hardest” 
diplomatic terminologies those may be used in diplomatic correspondence to 
show the Indonesian Government’s utmost displeasure. 
Through this diplomatic note, the Ministry expressed the Indonesian Gov-
ernment’s strong protest to the Chinese Government for the obvious viola-
tion of Indonesia’s sovereign rights over its EEZ as well as the breach of 
Indonesia’s sovereignty by undermining and intervening in Indonesia’s right 
under international law in exercising legal enforcement in its own jurisdiction. 
Moreover, the government has also reiterated its strongest objection toward 
the baseless claims made by the Chinese Government over Indonesia’s EEZ, 
in contravention of the UNCLOS, as confirmed by the award of the Tribu-
47  Fadli, “Indonesia issues protest to Beijing over Chinese vessel trespassing in Natuna,” The Jakarta Post, 
31 December 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/12/31/indonesia-issues-protest-to-beijing-
over-chinese-vessel-trespassing-in-natuna.html.
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nal in 2016, including the nine-dash line claim and the “Traditional Fishing 
Ground” in Indonesia’s EEZ. At the same time, the protest through this dip-
lomatic notes has emphasized that those Chinese unlawful acts were also a 
repetition of a similar operation conducted in 2016.
The Indonesian Government also urges the Chinese Government to re-
strain from exercising activities in contravention of international law which 
would potentially lead to unnecessary tension in the region. In fact, Indonesia 
emphasizes its statement that it will take all necessary actions including legal 
enforcement with a view to secure its sovereignty, sovereign rights and juris-
diction in accordance with international law including the UNCLOS.
On 31 December 2019, the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Spokesperson 
made a daily press statement and stated that:
“China has sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and has sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction over relevant waters near the Nansha Islands. In the 
meantime, China has historical rights in the South China Sea. Chinese 
fishermen have long been engaging in fishery activities in relevant waters 
near the Nansha Islands, which has all along been legal and legitimate. 
The China Coast Guard were performing their duty by carrying out rou-
tine patrol to maintain maritime order and protect our people’s legitimate 
rights and interests in the relevant waters. Our ambassador to Indone-
sia reiterated China’s consistent position to the Indonesian side. China 
would like to work with Indonesia to continue managing disputes properly 
through bilateral dialogue, and to maintain friendly cooperation as well 
as peace and stability in the South China Sea.”48 
At the same day with the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson’s 
statement, on 31 December 2019, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
also made a press statement rejecting that China’s Unilateral Claim over the 
Indonesia’s EEZ.49 From the Indonesia’s side, it said that firstly, the Republic 
of Indonesia rejects the statement made by the Spokesperson of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on 31 December 2019 of 
which China claims a historic title over Indonesia’s EEZ. Secondly, The claim 
over Indonesia’s EEZ based on historic title that Chinese fishermen have long 
been conducting their fishing activities in the said waters is unilateral in nature 
and has no legal basis whatsoever under the UNCLOS. Furthermore, this par-
48  “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on December 31, 2019”, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, accessed 1 May 2020, https://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/mfa_eng/ xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1729013.shtml




ticular argument had been deliberated and decided to be in contravention of 
international law by the arbitral judgment of 2016. The Republic of Indonesia 
further rejects the use of the term “relevant waters” claimed by the People’s 
Republic of China as this term is not recognized under UNCLOS.50
Thirdly, The Republic of Indonesia urges the People’s Republic of China 
to provide a clear legal reasoning for its claimed entitlement based on UN-
CLOS and the geographical limits with respect to China’s claim over Indo-
nesia’s EEZ. And the last point, pursuant to the provisions of UNCLOS, the 
Republic of Indonesia does not have overlapping maritime entitlements with 
the People’s Republic of China. Any dialogue concerning the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between the two countries is therefore unnecessary and 
irrelevant.
Two days later, on 2 January 2020, the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Spokes-
person made a daily press statement again concerning the China’s claim to the 
Indonesia’s EEZ. The spokesperson stated, 
“I elaborated on China’s position and propositions on the South China 
Sea issue the day before yesterday and see no need to repeat them here. 
I want to stress that China’s position and propositions comply with the 
international law, including UNCLOS. So whether the Indonesian side ac-
cepts it or not, nothing will change the objective fact that China has rights 
and interests over the relevant waters. The so-called award of the South 
China Sea arbitration is illegal, null and void and we have long made it 
clear that China neither accepts nor recognizes it. The Chinese side firmly 
opposes any country, organization or individual using the invalid arbitra-
tion award to hurt China’s interests.”51
 Knowing the Chinese Foreign Ministry has made a press statement 
again, on 3 January 2020, or a day after, the Indonesian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Retno Marsudi, also made a “4 conclusions” concerning the Indone-
sia’s position regarding this Natuna incident.52 First, The China’s coastguard 
vessels had committed violations in Indonesia’s EEZ. Second, Indonesia’s 
EEZ had been acknowledged as Indonesia’s territorial waters through the 
UNCLOS. Third, China is one of the signatories and parties to UNCLOS, so 
that China is obliged to honour the implementation of UNCLOS. And fourth, 
50  Damos Dumoli Agusman, “Understanding the Natuna Incident,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic 
of Indonesia, 2020.
51  “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on January 2, 2020,” Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, accessed 1 May 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/ xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1729272.shtml
52  Andita Rahma, “Natuna Waters: Indonesia Opposes China’s Nine-Dash Line,” Tempo.co, https://
en.tempo.co/read/1290785/natuna-waters-indonesia-opposes-chinas-nine-dash-line.
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Minister Retno further added that Indonesia would never recognize the Nine-
Dash Line claimed by China because it does not have a legal basis recognized 
by international law, including the UNCLOS. In addition, Indonesia will be 
increasing the frequency of patrols in Natuna waters, “and fisheries activity as 
it is Indonesia’s rights.”53
A few days later, on 6 January 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China issued a diplomatic note addressed to the Embassy 
of the Republic of Indonesia in Beijing and has reiterated the China’s position 
as follows: First, it stated that the Nansha Islands are China’s inherent terri-
tory, and has sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters based 
on the Nansha Islands. China claimed that it also has historic rights in the 
relevant waters of the South China Sea, which is consistent with the relevant 
international law, including the UNCLOS and international practices. 
Second, the Chinese fishing vessels and fishermen have long engaged 
in fishing activities in those relevant waters are both lawful and legitimate. 
Therefore, the Chinese Government believed that as part of its duties, the Chi-
na Coast Guard has conducted routine patrols in these waters in accordance 
with law and for the purpose of maintaining order and protecting the life and 
property od Chinese fishermen from violation. 
Third, it reiterated the China’s position on the Arbitral Tribunal’s Awards 
to the South China Sea that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the Philip-
pine’s submissions, and exercised that the jurisdiction ultra vires. Therefore, 
the Tribunal’s awards are null and void, and contrary to the principles of fair-
ness and justice. As a consequence, China has neither accepted nor partici-
pated in the Arbitral Tribunal, and the Tribunal’s awards will never affect the 
China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South 
China Sea.
Fourth, on this last point of the China’s diplomatic note, the Chinese 
Government mentioned about the comprehensive strategic partnership with 
Indonesia as well as emphasized the good communication and coordination 
the two countries have maintained on the South China Sea over the years. It 
is said that China wishes Indonesia will work together in order to properly 
manage the relevant issues through bilateral dialogue and consultation. Those 
four points were the first Chinese Government responses to the Indonesian 
Government rejections through a diplomatic channel, before finally Chinese 
Foreign Ministry’s Spokesperson made a press statement, a day after. 54 
53  Ibid.
54  “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on January 7, 2020,” Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, accessed 1 May 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
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 On 7 January 2020, during his daily press statement, the Chinese For-
eign Ministry’s Spokesperson mentioned about the 70th anniversary of diplo-
matic ties between Indonesia and China which is also an important year of 
national development in both countries. He also stated that as comprehensive 
strategic partners, China and Indonesia enjoy broad cooperation with great 
potential. At the same time, he stressed out in particular concerning the ef-
fective China-Indonesia cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
has brought tangible benefits to both peoples. China stands ready to work with 
Indonesia to further deepen BRI cooperation.55
 And eventually, he mentioned that China and Indonesia have been in 
communication with each other through diplomatic channels. Therefore, as 
the littoral countries of the South China Sea and major countries in the region, 
both China and Indonesia shoulder the important task of safeguarding regional 
peace and stability, and maintain the bilateral relationship from a strategic and 
long-term perspective. He also emphasized in terms of disputes, both coun-
tries shall properly resolve the differences and foster favourable atmosphere 
and conditions for celebrating the 70th anniversary of our diplomatic ties.
C. INDONESIA’S RESPONSE TO NATUNA INCIDENT
Indonesia has always been firm and clear in showing the responses to both 
the Chinese claims on nine-dash line and over the Natuna Sea. In every oc-
casions and events, including during the 25th UNCLOS Anniversary Seminar, 
the Writer has always mentioned one of the most important ways to response 
the Chinese government over this issue is a protest through diplomatic notes. 
Indonesia has sent these diplomatic notes to show the government’s consisten-
cy and persistent in protesting the claim. It’s been since the Chinese Delega-
tion distributed the nine-dash line’s map in the South China Sea Workshop ini 
1993, then the first Natuna incident when the Chinese government utilize the 
term of “traditional Chinese fishing area” in 2009 and the second Natuna inci-
dent with another new term of “traditional Chinese fishing ground” occurred 
again in 2016, and three years later, in 2019, the Natuna incident took place 
again, while this time using the term of “historic rights In relevant waters”, 
Indonesia has been always issuing diplomatic notes to show its consistently 
and persistently protest.
The substance of these diplomatic notes has also been the same, which is 
consistent to protest and reject the nine-dash line claim or any other related-
terms used by the Chinese government. These protests has always consistently 
consisted of three main points, which first stated that Indonesia is not a claim-
mfa_eng/ xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1729272.shtml
55  Ibid.
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ant state and has neither overlapping claims nor party to the territorial dispute 
in the South China Sea, therefore, Indonesia has nothing to negotiate with 
China. Second, it’s been always stated also in those diplomatic notes that ac-
cording to the Arbitral Tribunal awards in 2016, this China’s nine-dash line is 
incompatible with UNCLOS. And the last point, the Indonesian government 
has also stressed that this nine-dash line claim has no legal basis under inter-
national law and therefore it’s a breach to the UNCLOS.
Moreover, these protest notes through diplomatic channels have legal 
significances. First, it shows Indonesia’s persistent objection. In international 
law, this norm provides that if a state persistently objects to a newly emerging 
norm of customary international law during the formation of that norm, then 
the objecting state is exempt from the norm once it crystallises into law.56 
This objection to the emergence of a norm may come in the form of state-
ments declaring a state’s position on an existing right, or action in which a 
state exercises an existing right in the face of an emerging norm which would 
threaten that right.57 Therefore, in this case, Indonesia has made the form of 
statements through diplomatic notes declaring its position consistently and 
persistently against the nine-dash line claim. In other words, this action in 
which Indonesia exercises aimed to prevent the nine-dash line claim become 
what so-the Writer-called “embryonic” and “consolidated”. Therefore, Indo-
nesia will never been bound by such claim.
Moreover, in line with Indonesia’s persistent objection, it has also pointed 
out that Indonesia underscores China’s claim which is not legal and therefore 
their claims lost its value under the principle of international law, which known 
as “estoppel”. International law has long recognized the doctrine of estoppel, a 
principle which prevents states from acting inconsistently to the detriment of 
others.58 Until the 1980s, the use of estoppel in Public International Law was 
limited to cases involving territorial claims.59 Moreover, International estop-
pel is based on good faith and promotes consistency in international relations. 
Therefore, the China’s inconsistency action without any good faith has been 
disadvantaging many other countries, including Indonesia. As a consequence, 
the unilateral nine-dash line claim will no longer valuable under international 
56  The conceptual role of the rule may be interpreted as straightforward: to preserve the fundamentalist 
positivist notion that any norm of international law can only bind a state that has consented to be bound by 
it. In reality, however, numerous unanswered questions exist about the way that it works in practice. James 
A. Green, The Persistent Objector Rule in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2016), 37.
57  Ibid.
58  Thomas Cottier and Jörg Paul Müller, Estoppel in Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 
2011), 32.
59  It is a broad concept, capable of myriad applications, and as a “general principle of law recognized by 




law. This doctrine basically asserts that the behavior of a country that secretly 
or firmly recognizes a fact results in the loss of its rights subsequently to make 
the opposite claim.60
The behaviors of China in this regard, as explained above, as follows: 
First, China has never protested the 1969 Indonesia-Malaysia Continental 
Shelf Agreement in the South China Sea (within the nine-dash line), and Chi-
na has also never protested the Indonesian Declaration on the EEZ in 1980 
even though it was clearly announced that this EEZ boundaries in the South 
China Sea were within the nine-dash line.
On the other hand, China has also never protested against the Indonesian 
map since the 1980s which was officially issued by the Indonesian Agency, 
that has drawn the boundaries of the Indonesia’s EEZ to the nine-dash line. 
And lastly, during the UNCLOS negotiations way back in the 1980s, the Chi-
nese Delegation never raised the nine-dash line claim.
V. CONCLUSION
The Indonesian government has been rejecting the nine-dash line claim 
consistently and persistently. This Indonesia’s consistent and persistent action 
has carried out by issuing official protest through diplomatic notes. Indonesia 
has officially protested the China’s claim by sending several diplomatic notes 
through its embassy in Jakarta. This Indonesia’s consistent and persistent ac-
tion is also in accordance with the norm “Persistent Objection” under inter-
national law.
This Indonesia’s persistent objection furthermore provides that if Indone-
sia persistently objects the nine-dash line claim, those have came in the form 
of sending protests through diplomatic notes or exerting the action of the In-
donesian government by exercising its power over the Natuna sea against such 
claim, then Indonesia is exempt from those claims once it crystallises into law, 
in this regard the customary international law.
Besides Indonesia’s persistent objection recognized under the interna-
tional law, Indonesia also underscores China’s claim which is not legal and 
therefore their claims lost its value under the principle of international law, 
which known as “estoppel”. Indonesia found that this China’s unilateral claim 
and inconsistency action have been exercised without any good faith and did 
disadvantaging many other countries, including Indonesia, and therefore has 
been against the principle of estoppel which prevents states from acting in-
60  Damos Dumoli Agusman, “Understanding the Natuna Incident”.
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consistently to the detriment of others, and based on good faith and promotes 
consistency in international relations.
Moreover, Indonesia’s current position is to remain firm on the matter of 
principle, that is Indonesia’s sovereign rights guaranteed by the UNCLOS, as 
the Indonesia’s EEZ had been acknowledged as Indonesia’s territorial waters 
through the UNCLOS, and therefore there is no room for any negotiation. 
Furthermore, Indonesia would never recognize the Nine-Dash Line claimed 
by China since it does not have a legal basis recognized by international law, 
including the UNCLOS. At the same time, Indonesia will be increasing the 
frequency of patrols in Natuna waters, and fisheries activities as it is Indone-
sia’s rights. 
On the other hand, in line with China, this issue does not necessarily in-
terfere with greater cooperation. For this reason, Indonesia has maintained its 
bilateral relation without touching on this principle. At the diplomacy level, 
Indonesia needs to continue its attitude of persistent objection. In addition, it 
is necessary to examine the repositioning steps that are being and will be car-
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